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Abstract 
We explore whether national economic prosperity enhances mutual generalized 
trust. This is done using panel data of multiple waves of the World Values Surveys, 
whereby national income levels are instrumented for using exogenous oil price 
shocks. We find significant and substantial effects of national income on the level 
of trust in the economy. In particular, a one percent increase in national income 
tends to cause an average increase of one-percentage point (or more) in the 
likelihood that a person becomes trustful. We also identify crime and corruption as 
potential mechanisms that may lead to the reported causal effect and explore 
heterogeneous effects across individuals. 
Keywords: Trust; National Income; Oil Price Shocks, Crime, Corruption, City Size 
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“Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an 
element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a 
period of time.” (Arrow, 1972) 
Introduction 
In his seminal work, Banfield (1958) summarized impressions and interviews he 
conducted in a deprived village community in south Italy. Banfield’s argument was that the 
crucial component behind the village’s impoverishment was cultural, specifically the 
villagers’ cherished norm of what he called “amoral familism,” as opposed to the value of 
acting for the sake of the common good of the community. This family-centric orientation, 
according to Banfield, was related to mistrust and suspicion among the villagers, leading to 
their inability to act in tandem and, thus, contributing to the (lack of) economic development 
of their community at large. This work inspired subsequent literature on social capital and 
generalized trust. In particular, the level of trust in an economy has been shown to be 
correlated with economic performance, specifically, with economic growth.1 Generalized 
trust (i.e., trust in anonymous individuals, as opposed to trust among familiar people) may 
positively affect welfare in a society through better cooperation and contract enforcement, 
i.e., trust is instrumental in avoiding prisoner dilemma outcomes.  
More recently, effects of trust on various aggregate outcomes have been explored in, 
for example, Aghion et al. (2010), Bjornskov (2009, 2010), Bjornskov and Meon (2013), and 
Bjornskov and Svendsen (2013). The documented importance of trust implies that there is 
                                                            
1Fukuyama (1995) and Uslaner (2002) provide conceptual underpinnings for this relationship. Additional 
important work includes Knack and Keefer (1997), Zak and Knack (2001), and a survey Guiso et al. (2008), 
as well as the more recent Algan and Cahuc (2013) and Bjornskov (2012). While this relationship has been 
mostly exhibited in a cross-national setting, Dincer and Uslaner (2010) find positive associations between 




potential interest in studying its nationwide determinants and their mechanisms. This has 
been done in, for example, Bjornskov (2006), although identification obstacles in 
disentangling causality have been acknowledged by the author. 
One important question in this regard is whether economic prosperity and, in 
particular, higher national income breeds trust. Indeed, already in Banfield (1958), economic 
backwardness and poverty are viewed not only as a consequence but also as a cause of distrust 
(c.f., “If the average income were increased by a large amount, people would sooner or later 
act on a broader conception of self-interest.” p. 169). While some positive indications on the 
causal effect of income on trust are provided in Bjornskov (2006), this question has received 
relatively little attention so far. The recent paper Ananyev and Guriev (2018) addresses it by 
focusing on a natural experiment, whereby Russia’s administrative regions were differently 
affected by the incidence of the 2008–09 economic crisis. In particular, whereas the average 
GDP decline in Russia was 8 percent, the per capita gross regional product declined more in 
Russian regions that specialized in the production of capital-intensive goods. The 
heterogeneous impact of the 2008–09 economic crisis across regions differing in industrial 
structures enables the authors to explore the effect of regional variation in income on trust. 
They find that reductions in regional income lead to a deterioration of trust. Their estimated 
effect is sizable: a 10-percent decline in income causes a 2.6-percentage point reduction in 
the level of trust.2 
In this paper, our goal is to add to the literature by analyzing the effect of income on 
trust in a broader context and to explore mechanisms through which income may affect trust. 
                                                            





We use a cross-country panel data set comprising 62 countries during the period 1981–2010. 
Our data on trust are from the World Values Survey, and they include all available survey 
waves. These data have been used widely in the literature (see, for example, Guiso et al., 
2008) to explore the relationship between trust and other variables, including economic 
growth.  
To motivate our research, we present graphical evidence of the relationship between 
per capita GDP and average trust that is prevalent in countries. As observed in Figure 1, there 
is a positive and significant correlation between these two variables in our sample. This 
pattern is also present when distinguishing between OECD member 3  and non-member 
countries, which have high and medium levels of national income, see Figure 2.  
Figure 1. Trust and log GDP Per Capita 
Note: Correlation controlled for individual characteristics.  
                                                            
3 These are Australia, Canada, Chile, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, 
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Figure 2. Trust and log GDP Per Capita by Country’s OECD Association 
Note: Correlation controlled for individual characteristics.  
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we extend extant analysis by 
including more recent survey waves—which incidentally provide ever more comprehensive 
country coverage. Second, by including country fixed effects, we focus on within-country 
variations in national income and trust, thus controlling for all the potentially omitted fixed 
factors. Third, we use oil price shocks as an instrumental variable for national income, which 
enables us to extract exogenous variation in national economic prosperity. The oil price shock 
instrument for national income has been used in the literature in several contexts (e.g., 
Brueckner et al., 2012a, b), and it has been found to be a strong instrumental variable for 
persistent variation in national income. Fourth, we explore channels through which national 
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Relating individual trust attitudes to nation-wide exogenous income, at the same time 
controlling for a battery of individual-specific characteristics, we find that national income 
has a significant effect on trust attitudes. In particular, a 1-percent increase in national income 
tends to cause an average increase of one percentage point in the likelihood that a person 
becomes trustful. While this is generally consistent with existing studies, the contribution 
here is in interpreting the result in causal terms. Our approach and results are broadly 
consistent with Ananyev and Guriev (2018); while that paper does not use oil price shocks 
to generate variation in income, the spirit of its analysis is similar.  
Beyond establishing the causal effect of national income on trust, we also explore 
mechanisms through which this effect materializes. Broadly, our background argument is 
that national prosperity is a signal of a well-functioning economy that allocates resources to 
productive use as opposed to rent seeking.4 Consequently, we would expect to find evidence 
of a more civic behavior (and not just attitudes) in a prosperous economy. In order to examine 
whether this argument is supported by data, we conduct a complementary analysis of the 
effect that income has on various measures of criminal behavior and corruption. We find that 
increases in national income lead to a significant reduction in criminal behavior and 
corruption. 
We also address the question as to whether the effect of economic prosperity on trust 
affects population groups differentially. Employing interaction terms with individual-level 
characteristics, we find that the effect of national income on trust is significantly larger 
among individuals in the low socioeconomic strata, i.e., poorer, less educated, small-town 
                                                            





The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We describe the data and the sample in the 
next section, followed by the presentation of our empirical strategy in the third section. The 
main empirical results follow. In this section we also address the exclusion restriction of our 
instrumental variable. The fifth section focuses on the mechanism of transmission that help 
explain how national income impact trust, and presents results on heterogeneous effects. The 
final section concludes with brief remarks. 
Data and Sample 
We examine the effect of national income on trust by estimating the relationship 
between country's per capita GDP (PPP) and a measure of trust among individuals. We 
employ information from three independent data sets to this end.  
Our main source of information is the World Value Surveys (WVS), a cross-country 
longitudinal dataset collected by the Inter University Consortium for Political and Social 
Research (ICPSR) in over 117 countries. The data cover the interval from 1981 to 2014 
through six waves of data assembled over the following periods: the first wave covers 1981–
84; the second wave spans over 1990–94; the third wave is held during 1995–98; the fourth 
wave covers 1999–2004; the fifth wave covers 2005–08; and the sixth wave covers 2010–
14. The data include adult citizens at least 15 years old who were interviewed to express their 
views anonymously about what they value in life and what they perceive is valued by others. 
In particular, the survey contains information about perceptions across the following 
subjects: environment, work, family, politics and society, religion and morale, national 




generalized trust of individuals towards their peers, which is measured by individuals’ 
responses to the question: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" The answers are recoded 
into a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1, which stands for "Most people can be 
trusted," and 0, which stands for "Need to be very careful."5 The dataset also allows us to 
draw on a set of control variables reported at an individual level. 
The main explanatory variable is GDP per capita. For the period 1981–2010, GDP 
per capita data are drawn from the International Comparison Program’s database gathered by 
the World Bank. Specifically, we use the variable annual real per capita GDP measured in 
constant international dollars that were converted using purchasing power parity (PPP) rates 
based on the 2011 International Comparison Round (ICP). To smooth year-to-year changes 
across the analyzed period, we take the natural logarithm of the GDP per capita variable. 
Our instrument for the endogenous country-level per capita GDP is oil price shocks. 
The original dataset is drawn from Brueckner et al. (2012a). Oil prices are the simple average 
of the Dubai, Brent and Texas price reports that cover the period 1960–2001, which are drawn 
from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Commodity Statistics 
(UNCTAD, 2009). The oil price shock variable is constructed by multiplying the change in 
the natural logarithm of the international oil price with countries’ average share of net oil 
exports in GDP. Thus, we take into consideration that variations in international oil prices 
affect countries national incomes depending on their commercial position as net importers or 
exporters. Formally, the oil price shock instrument is constructed as follows:  
                                                            
5 The original options in the WVS are scaled 1 and 2, where 1 stands for “Most people can be trusted” and 2 




𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑐,𝑡 = ∆ ln(𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)𝑡 ∗ 𝜃𝑐  (1) 
where ∆ ln(OilPrice)t is the difference in the natural log of the international oil price in 
period t in comparison to the previous year; and weights it by the average share of net oil 
exports over GDP. This is denoted by the time-invariant factor 𝜃𝑐 that corresponds to country 
c. For the estimation sample, summary statistics of the oil price shock variable for period t 
are reported in Table 1. 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Country characteristics      
Oilshock1, t 164,457   0.001   0.005   -0.005   0.043  
GDP per capita PPP (constant 2011 
international $)  164,457   15,498   16,162   847   127,236  
Log GDP per capita, PPP (constant 
2011 international $)  164,457   0.750   0.433  0.000   1.000  
           
Individual's characteristics           
Agreement with opinion that says 
that most people can be trusted2 
164,457 0.750 0.433 0.000 1.000 
Male 164,457 0.487 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Age 164,044 40 16 15 99 
Marital status: married 164,457 0.625 0.484 0.000 1.000 
Number of children 154,043 2.016 1.927 0.000 8.000 
Highest educational level attained: 
primary or secondary 
148,131 0.772 0.420 0.000 1.000 
Notes: (1) The variable measures the change in log of international oil price, times countries' GDP 
shares of oil net exports for period t. (2) The variable of trust is captured by the question "Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing 
with people?" The answers were coded 1, which stands for "Most people can be trusted," and 2, which 
equals "Need to be very careful." The latter answer was recoded with 0 value instead of 2. 
For the purpose of this study, we consolidate the information from the three sources 




for 62 countries; this sample is dictated by the available data on trust, income and the oil 
price shock instrument. The list of home countries of the analyzed individuals is presented 
in Appendix A. Also, the full set of variables tested to control individual and country’s 
characteristics are reported with summary statistics in Table 1. We present specifications 
including main basic controls such as gender, age, marital status, number of children and 
highest education level achieved. The definition of these variables is explained in detail in 
Appendix B. Finally, the summary statistics of the proposed instrument in the estimation 
sample is also reported in Table 1. 
Empirical Framework 
Baseline Specification 
Our goal is to estimate the effect of national income on interpersonal trust. The 
literature (see the survey section in the introduction) has addressed this topic empirically at 
the country and individual levels; and it has shown that higher-income individuals have 
indeed higher levels of trust. Nevertheless, empirical papers thus far have mainly drawn 
conclusions based on correlations between the studied variables, leaving open the question 
whether trust increments nationwide are caused by higher income levels. 
We attempt to quantify the causal effect of national income on trust among 
individuals based on cross country analysis, using log per capita GDP that accounts for the 
average individual’s income; and a broad trust measure in the sense that it does not capture 
confidence with respect to a specific group (e.g., by ethnicity, organizations or institutions). 
For this purpose, we employ an estimation strategy set at the individual level. Our baseline 




𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛾𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑡) + 𝑋′𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛿 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜏𝑗 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡  (2) 
where 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the reported trust level of individual i in country j in period t that 
corresponds to the year when the survey was conducted. The variable 
𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑡  corresponds to average income at purchasing power parity of 
country j for the corresponding period in which the individual reports her or his level of trust. 
Thus 𝛾 is our parameter of interest, which measures the response of trust to a change in 
national income.  
We include in the econometric model time and country fixed effects and individual-
level controls to increase the efficiency of our parameter estimates. We compute standard 
errors that are Huber robust and clustered at the country level.  
Identification 
We consider that least squares estimation of equation (2) does not provide consistent 
estimates of 𝛾 since, in particular, trust affects income per capita. To address causality issues, 
we use plausibly exogenous oil price shocks as an instrument of log per capita GDP, within 
a conditional joint maximum likelihood estimation method allowing for national income to 
be endogenous.  
Our identification assumption is that the oil price shock instrument only has a 
systematic effect on trust through variations in national income. Moreover, we propose that 
lagged values of oil price shocks are likely to affect per capita GDP as do contemporary 
shocks due to its persistent effect. In particular, the second-stage equation is given by: 




where 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the trust indicator of individual i that lives in country j in period t. We 
control for a set of individual characteristics expressed in vector ?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡 and country-specific 
fixed effects (𝜏𝑗) to account for within-country factors that affect both trust and income levels. 
We also allow survey year fixed effects ( 𝜑𝑡 ) in our specification. The term 
𝐸[ln(𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡) |?̅?𝑗𝑡] stands for the predicted level of log per capita GDP obtained 
from ?̅?𝑗𝑡 , which is a vector of variables including 𝑍𝑗𝑡 , 𝑍𝑗𝑡−1 , and 𝑍𝑗𝑡−2. In particular, the 
predicted level of log per capita GDP is obtained from the following equation:  
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝜋0𝑍𝑗𝑡 + 𝜋1𝑍𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜋2𝑍𝑗𝑡−2 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑗𝑡𝜃 + 𝜔𝑗 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜃𝑗𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡 (4) 
Equation (4) corresponds to our first stage equation. The set of variables, 
𝑍𝑗𝑡, 𝑍𝑗𝑡−1 and 𝑍𝑗𝑡−2, corresponds to the instruments, i.e., one contemporaneous (for period t) 
and two lagged values of oil price shocks (for periods t-1 and t-2). Various specifications of 
lagged values were tested to capture the persistent income effects triggered by variations in 
the oil price instrument. Specifically, the instrumental variables employed are the following: 
(1) contemporaneous oil price shock; (2) oil price shock of period t-1; (3) oil price shock of 
period t-2; (4) oil price shock of period t and t-1; and (5) oil price shocks of periods t, t-1 and 
t-2. As documented in Brueckner et al. (2012a, 2012b), there is a strong correlation between 
the vector ?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡 and 𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡), implying 𝜋0 ≠ 0, 𝜋1 ≠ 0, 𝜋2 ≠ 0. 
Results 
In Table 2 we present baseline estimates of the effects of country's per capita GDP on 
trust in people. The estimates are based on the model described in the previous section. We 
report three specifications in which country and survey years’ fixed effects are included. 




of trust in people; column 2 shows this effect when controlling in the econometric model for 
a set of potentially relevant individual characteristics; and column 3 adds the highest 
educational level attained as a trust determinant. Columns 1–3 of Table 2 show a statistically 
significant and positive income effect on trust. Quantitatively, we observe that this 
relationship is stronger when controlling for differences in individuals’ education.  
Table 2. Effects of Country's Per Capita GDP on Trust in People, Probit Results 
Dependent variable Probit 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Log GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $) 
0.0974* 0.0993* 0.160** 





    (0.00701) (0.00815) 
Age in years   -0.000373 -0.000887*** 
    (0.000237) (0.000317) 
Number of children     -0.00474* 
      (0.00282) 
Highest educational level attained       
Primary or secondary complete/incomplete     0.191*** 
      (0.00993) 





    (0.00766) (0.00960) 
Individual wealth       
Income deciles     -0.0219*** 
      (0.00187) 
Constant -0.264 -0.230 -0.736 
  (0.494) (0.495) (0.696) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Survey year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 164,457 164,044 123,528 
LR chi2 13531 13543 11661 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 




Notes: The method of estimation is maximum likelihood estimation. The observations are at the 
individual-level unit. The dependent variable is measured with the question: "Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with 
people?" where the value 0 stands for "Need to be very careful," and 1 stands for "Most people can 
be trusted." Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following 
system: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%. 
In order to obtain an estimate of the causal effect of national income on individuals’ 
trust, we use an IV approach. Maximum likelihood estimates of how (instrumented) national 
real per capita GDP affect the levels of average trust attitudes towards people are reported in 
Table 3. We begin by exploring this effect using oil price shocks of period t as instruments 
for real per capita income reported during period t. Both country and survey year’s fixed 
effects are included in the regression. Columns (1) to (3) of Table 3 show that a positive 
effect of national income on trust holds across the three specifications thus far described. 
Instrumental variables estimation yields a positive effect of national income on trust. 
We can reject the null that the coefficient on national income is equal to zero at the 1-percent 
significance level for all three specifications. Quantitatively, the coefficient on national 
income is largest in column (3) where we control for individuals’ characteristics, in 
particular, education. The coefficient (standard error) on national income in column (3) is 
around 1.46 (0.29). This coefficient should be interpreted as a 1-percent increase in GDP per 
capita increasing the likelihood of trust by around 1.46 percentage points. Roughly, the IV 
estimate in Table 3 can thus be read as a 1-percent increase in national income increasing the 





Table 3. Effects of Country's Per Capita GDP on Trust in People, IV Results 
(IV: Contemporaneous oil price shock, t) 
  Trust in people 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Log GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $) 
0.973*** 1.005*** 1.995*** 
(0.234) (0.234) (0.377) 
Male   -0.0229*** -0.0140* 
    (0.00700) (0.00813) 
Age in years   -0.000423* -0.000771** 
    (0.000237) (0.000317) 
Marital status       
Married   -0.0309*** -0.0106 
    (0.00766) (0.00959) 
Number of children     -0.00564** 
      (0.00282) 
Highest educational level attained       
Primary or secondary complete/incomplete     0.197*** 
      (0.00996) 
Individual wealth       
Income deciles     -0.0222*** 
      (0.00187) 
Constant -7.776*** -7.998*** -16.75*** 
  (2.010) (2.011) (3.294) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Survey year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 164,457 164,044 123,528 
Under identification test (first stage F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald chi-squared 13617 13635 11853 
Wald chi-squared test of exogeneity 14.83 15.85 24.49 
Model Wald p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: The method of estimation is maximum likelihood estimation. The observations are at the 
individual-level unit. The dependent variable is measured with the question: "Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with 
people?" where the value 0 stands for "Need to be very careful" and 1 stands for "Most people can 
be trusted". Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero 
are denoted by the following system: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%. 
 
It is noteworthy that the instrumental variables regressions in Table 3 yield 
coefficients on national income that are larger than those reported in Table 2 (where national 




coefficient in Table 3 is equal to the coefficient in Table 2 at the 1-percent significance level. 
Hence, not instrumenting GDP per capita leads to an understatement of the causal effect that 
national income has on trust. Tables 4 and 5 document that the second-stage coefficients on 
national income are of similar magnitude and statistical significance when we use lagged oil 
price shocks of periods t-1 and t-2 as instruments for per capita GDP of period t.  
Table 4. Effects of Country's Per Capita GDP on Trust in People, IV Results 
(IV: Lagged values of oil price shock t-1) 
  Trust in people 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Log GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $) 
1.239*** 1.325*** 2.205*** 
(0.421) (0.421) (0.392) 
Male   -0.0242*** -0.0155* 
    (0.00704) (0.00820) 
Age in years   -0.000441* -0.000754** 
    (0.000239) (0.000320) 
Marital status       
Married   -0.0311*** -0.0101 
    (0.00771) (0.00967) 
Number of children     -0.00572** 
      (0.00283) 
Highest educational level attained       
Primary or secondary complete/incomplete     0.195*** 
      (0.0100) 
Individual wealth       
Income deciles     -0.0236*** 
      (0.00189) 
Constant -10.05*** -10.73*** -18.55*** 
  (3.608) (3.607) (3.420) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Survey year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 162,459 162,046 121,636 
Under identification test (first stage F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald chi-squared 13657 13689 11890 
Wald chi-squared test of exogeneity 7.460 8.591 27.97 
Model Wald p-value  0.006  0.003 0.000 
Notes: The method of estimation is maximum likelihood estimation. The observations are at the 
individual-level unit. The dependent variable is measured with the question: "Generally speaking, 




people?" where the value 0 stands for "Need to be very careful" and 1 stands for "Most people can 
be trusted". Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero 
are denoted by the following system: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%. 
 
Table 5. Effects of Country's Per Capita GDP on Trust in People, IV Results  
(IV: Lagged values of oil price shock t-2) 
  Trust in people 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Log GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $) 
1.382*** 1.420*** 1.996** 
(0.501) (0.502) (0.800) 
Male   -0.0262*** -0.0180** 
    (0.00718) (0.00843) 
Age in years   -0.000330 -0.000630* 
    (0.000246) (0.000332) 
Marital status       
Married   -0.0349*** -0.0163 
    (0.00787) (0.00992) 
Number of children     -0.00570** 
      (0.00287) 
Highest educational level attained       
Primary or secondary complete/incomplete     0.197*** 
      (0.0103) 
Individual wealth       
      -0.0234*** 
      (0.00193) 
Constant -11.29*** -11.56*** 8.714*** 
  (4.305) (4.311) (0.00124) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Survey year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 156,790 156,377 116,547 
Under identification test (first stage F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald chi-squared 13578 13599 11712 
Wald chi-squared test of exogeneity 7.456 7.802 11712 
Model Wald p-value  0.006  0.005 0.003 
Notes: The method of estimation is maximum likelihood estimation. The observations are at the 
individual-level unit. The dependent variable is measured with the question: "Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with 
people?" where the value 0 stands for "Need to be very careful" and 1 stands for "Most people can 
be trusted". Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero 




Since the effect of oil shocks on GDP per capita may remain for periods longer than 
a year, a longer period set of lagged oil price shocks are also considered as instruments. Oil 
price shocks for period t and t-1 are used as instruments in Table 6. Here, we find a positive 
and significant link between per capita GDP and trust.  
Using a more comprehensive set of instruments supports our main finding that 
income has a significant positive effect on trust. Table 7 includes contemporaneous (period 
t) and lagged oil price shocks in period t-1 and t-2 as instruments. As can be seen from Table 
7, the coefficients on national income continue to be positive and significantly different from 
zero at the 1-percent significance level. Quantitatively, the second-stage coefficient on 
national income is around unity. We note that the quality of our instrumental variables is 
reasonable as the p-value of the F-statistic is below 1 percent; further, the F-statistic is well 
above 10.  
Table 6. Effects of Country's Per Capita GDP on Trust in People, IV Results 
(IV: Contemporaneous values and lagged values of oil price shock; t and t-1) 
  Trust in people 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Log GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $) 
0.875*** 0.891*** 2.095*** 
(0.217) (0.217) (0.746) 
Male   -0.0241*** -0.0154 
    (0.00705) (0.0121) 
Age in years   -0.000419* -0.000762 
    (0.000239) (0.00101) 
Marital status       
Married   -0.0314*** -0.0103 
    (0.00771) (0.0139) 
Number oh children     -0.00566*** 
      (0.00165) 
Highest educational level attained       
Primary or secondary complete/incomplete     0.195*** 




Individual wealth       
Individual income     -0.0235*** 
      (0.00797) 
Constant -6.932*** -7.017*** -17.60*** 
  (1.863) (1.862) (6.504) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Survey year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 162,459 162,046 121,636 
Under identification test (first stage F-statistic) 0.000 0.001 0.002 
Wald chi-squared 13597 13612 444.8 
Wald chi-squared test of exogeneity 13.77 14.29 4.014 
Model Wald p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: The method of estimation is maximum likelihood estimation. The observations are at the 
individual-level unit. The dependent variable is measured with the question: "Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with 
people?" where the value 0 stands for "Need to be very careful" and 1 stands for "Most people can 
be trusted". Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero 
are denoted by the following system: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%. 
 
Table 7. Effects of Country's Per Capita GDP on Trust in People, IV Results 
(IV: Contemporaneous values and lagged values of oil price shock; t, t-1 and t-2) 
  Trust in people 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Log GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $) 
0.730*** 0.740*** 1.967*** 
(0.197) (0.197) (0.653) 
Male   -0.0259*** -0.0180 
    (0.00719) (0.0115) 
Age in years   -0.000289 -0.000638 
    (0.000245) (0.00115) 
Marital status       
Married   -0.0350*** -0.0164 
    (0.00788) (0.0130) 
Number of children     -0.00574*** 
      (0.00207) 
Highest educational level attained       
Primary or secondary complete/incomplete     0.196*** 
      (0.0484) 
Individual wealth       
Individual income     -0.0235*** 
      (0.00829) 
Constant -5.688*** -5.724*** -16.49*** 




Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Survey year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 156,790 156,377 116,547 
Under identification test (first stage F-statistic) 0.000 0.001 0.002 
Wald chi-squared 13496 13511 364.7 
Wald chi-squared test of exogeneity 14.32 14.58 4.994 
Model Wald p-value  0.000   0.000   0.000  
Notes: The method of estimation is maximum likelihood estimation. The observations are at the 
individual-level unit. The dependent variable is measured with the question: "Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with 
people?" where the value 0 stands for "Need to be very careful" and 1 stands for "Most people can 
be trusted". Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero 
are denoted by the following system: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%. 
In addition to the results presented above, we also test for heterogeneous effects by 
introducing an interaction term between GDP and membership in the OECD. The purpose of 
this is to examine whether the impact of GDP is different in richer countries in relation to 
poorer ones. In Appendix C we observe that, whereas the GDP coefficient remains 
statistically significant for all specifications, the coefficient on the interaction term is negative 
and statistically significant for the first two specifications only and is insignificant when 
adding controls, as shown in the third column. Furthermore, when using our instrumental 
variables approach we find statistically insignificant results for all our specifications.6 These 
additional results show limited evidence that the impact of national income on trust differs 
systematically for OECD countries. 
We summarize our findings graphically in Figures 3 and 4. In these figures, variations 
in GDP are induced by the oil price shock instrument. In the first figure, we see a significant 
positive average relationship between per capita GDP and trust. The slope of the fitted line 
in Figure 3 is steeper than in Figure 1. Thus, the magnitude of the effect of national income 
                                                            




on trust is stronger when instrumenting GDP by plausibly exogenous oil price shocks. Figure 
4 shows the estimated slopes for OECD and non-OECD countries. We observe that the slope 
is somewhat higher for OECD than non-OECD countries, although quantitatively this 
difference is minuscule and the 95-percent confidence bands overlap.  
Figure 3. Trust and log GDP Per Capita, IV Results 
Note: GDP is instrumented with contemporaneous oil price shock. Confidence intervals outline +/- 
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Figure 4. Trust and log GDP Per Capita by Country’s OECD Association 
Note: GDP is instrumented with contemporaneous oil price shock. Confidence intervals outline +/- 
2 standard errors. 
In order to further address the exclusion restriction, we apply a Bayesian 
generalization of the standard 2SLS as developed in Conley et al. (2012).7 These researchers 
propose an approach alternative to a regular IV inference by assuming that the instruments 
are only plausibly or approximately exogenous and do not exactly satisfy the exclusion 
restriction.8 They assert that the amount of bias associated with the 𝛽 coefficient not only 
depends on 𝛾 but also on the parameter associated with the first stage. They argue that there 
                                                            
7 See also Kraay (2010), for a similar concept. A complementary test, the so-called Abadie Kappa, requires 
the use of a binary instrument, which cannot be applied in our case. 
8 The inference procedures proposed by the authors relax the exclusion restriction of the instrument. 
Specifically, the method proposes to estimate the following two equations. (i) 𝑌 = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝑍𝑦 + 𝑒 and (ii) 𝑋 =
𝑍𝜋 + 𝑣. Here, X is the endogenous variable and Z is the instrument. Theoretically, the standard assumption 
(exclusion restriction) is that the coefficient 𝛾 is equal to zero. Conley et al. (2012) propose a methodology 
that relaxes the assumption that this coefficient is equal to zero. The authors propose that the previous 
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is a parameter associated with the first stage estimation that is large enough to allow the 
estimation of β with negligible bias. We proceed to apply the methods by Conley et al. (2012) 
to all our estimations shown in Table 3 to Table 7, where we employed specifications of the 
form 𝑌 = 𝐹(𝑋𝛽 + 𝑍𝛾 + 𝑒) and where F is an accumulated normal distribution function. The 
relevant results are shown in Table 8. In the first panel of this table, we report results from 
an inference procedure that specifies a set of possible values of 𝛾 , labeled the union of 
confidence interval (UCI). In the second panel, we use the local to zero (LTZ) approximation 
developed by Conley et al (2012). To apply the LTZ approximation, we use estimates 
reported by Soares (2004); with these estimates in hand, we generate a distribution for 𝛾. As 
shown in Table 8, our results are robust to applying both procedures (i.e., relaxing the 
assumption that the instruments strictly satisfy the exclusion restriction continues to yield a 





Table 8. Confidence Interval Estimates for the effect of Trust on National Income 
    Confidence interval 
Instrumental variables specifications Lower bound Upper bound 
    
A. UCI method 
gamma [-2,10] 
IV contemporaneous ops, t 0.0446 2.12223 
IV lagged ops values, t-1 0.1601 2.3736 
IV lagged ops values, t-2 -3.2559 1.0509 
IV contemporaneous and lagged ops values: 
t, t-1, t-2     
  Contemporaneous ops, t 0.0508 2.6993 
  Lagged ops values, t-1 -0.0081 0.0022 
  Lagged ops values, t-2 -4.63E-04 -5.07E-05 
        
    
B. LTZ method 
one hundred iterations, gamma 
with mean=4; sd=4 
IV contemporaneous ops, t 0.3641 0.4108 
IV lagged ops values, t-1 0.477 0.5661 
IV lagged ops values, t-2 0.2976 0.3977 
IV contemporaneous and lagged ops values: 
t, t-1, t-2 0.3665 0.4073 
Notes: We report 95% confidence intervals obtained from the inference procedures 
proposed by Conley et al. (2012). The definition of γ is different across these methods. In 
panel A, the Union of CI method considers as prior information that the γ takes on values 
within the interval [−2, 10]. The “Local to Zero” method in panel B has as prior that γ ∼ 
N(4, 4). One hundred simulations of the coefficient has been made, taking as references to 
our prior distribution the coefficient sizes presented in Soares (2004). OPS means “oil 
shock prices”, our instrument, as detailed on the text. 
It is of interest to quantitatively compare our estimates to those in the literature. In 
their review article, Algan and Cahuc (2013) report LS estimates of trust on GDP per capita. 
In their regressions, a one standard deviation increase in the former (about 0.14) is associated, 
depending on a set of controls, with 0.2 to 0.6 increase in (log) income per capita (see Table 
3 there). According to our estimation using the UCI method of Conley et al. (2012), a one 
standard deviation increase in the instrumented GDP per capita (0.43) causes an increase in 




Cahuc (2013).9 In particular, the well documented positive correlation between trust and 
growth implies that the LS are biased upwards, so that our IV estimates should be expected 
to be lower than the LS estimates. 
Exploring Mechanisms and Heterogeneous Effects 
The results shown thus far portray the average effect of national income on 
interpersonal trust. In this section we focus on plausible channels of transmission underlying 
this causal effect and report heterogeneous effects. 
Crime and Corruption as a Transmission Mechanism 
We now explore the impact of national income on crime rates. While earlier economic 
studies focus on the incentives of criminal behavior as well as its cost and benefits to society, 
there has been a recent focus on the relationship between crime and development (Levitt and 
Miles, 2006; Soares, 2004). The relationship between trust and crime rates has been exhibited 
in Blanco and Ruiz (2013). 
We study the effect of national income on crime rates and corruption as a channel 
using an IV approach, as in the main analysis above.10 The data we use come from the 
International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS). The ICVS is a survey developed by an 
international working group under the coordination of the United Nations Interregional 
Crime and Justice Research Institute with the goal to address the constraints of official crime 
records and generate comparative criminological data (Van Dijk et al., 2007). The ICVS has 
                                                            
9 According to the alternative, LTZ method, the estimated effect is smaller, although still positive. It is to be 
noted that Algan and Cahuc’s sample is a sub-sample of ours, as it does not include the latest WVS wave; and 
their trust measure assumes four value—which, however, is unlikely to substantially affect the comparison. 




conducted surveys for 78 countries since 1989, making it one of the most comprehensive 
tools to study and monitor crime with an international perspective (see Van Dijk, 2010; Van 
Dijk et al., 2007). It is noteworthy that, while the coverage overlaps with the sample we use 
in the main estimation, crime data come from a distinct source and pertains to factual 
information. 
We employ the three most frequently reported measures of crime, namely robbery, 
assault and car theft. When matching the WVS and the ICSV data, we obtain a sample size 
of nearly 11,000 observations. Table 9 reports the results of a two-stage estimation. As in our 
core regressions above, the endogenous variable corresponds to GDP per capita, which is 
instrumented by oil price shocks as previously defined.11 As shown in columns 1 and 2, when 
using car theft rates as our dependent variable, we find a negative and statistically significant 
impact of GDP per capita. The result holds regardless of the type of crime perpetrated and 
whether we use data on crime that occurred one year or five years prior the survey. Moreover, 
the direction and size of the coefficients are robust to various specifications of the instrument, 
which are shown in panels A to C in the same table.12  
  
                                                            
11 First stages are reported in Appendix E and Appendix F. 
12 Additional specifications with different shock values (i.e., contemporaneous and lagged oil price shocks 
corresponding to t-3; t, t-1; t, t-1, t-2) further confirm our findings. For the sake of economy, these additional 




Table 9. Crime or Corruption Victims and National Gross Domestic Product, Second 

























last 5 years 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Panel A. IV is contemporaneous oil price shock, t 
Log GDP per 
capita 
-0.095 -0.099 -0.072 -0.068 -0.111 -0.114 -0.063 
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.001)*** 
        
Observations 10,910 10,910 10,910 10,910 10,910 10,910 10,910 
Wald chi-squared 5,503  4,935  3,354  3,502  870  813  38,751  
Model Wald p-
value  0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000  
0.000 
  Panel B. IV: lagged values of oil price shock, t-1 
Log GDP per 
capita 
-1.155 -1.227 -0.696 -0.689 -1.818 -1.901 -0.211 
  (0.297)*** (0.316)*** (0.181)*** (0.179)*** (0.493)*** (0.516)*** (0.038)*** 
        
Observations 10,910 10,910 10,910 10,910 10,910 10,910 10,910 
Wald chi-squared 24.89 24.12 25.17 25.57 16.27 16.27 3354 
Model Wald p-
value 
0.002  0.001   0.002  0.001  0.039  0.000  
0.001 
  Panel C. IV: Lagged values of oil price shock, t-2 
Log GDP per 
capita 
-0.161 -0.176 -0.110 -0.119 -0.307 -0.340 -0.099 
  (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.014)*** (0.016)*** (0.002)*** 
        
Observations 9,058 9,058 9,058 9,058 9,058 9,058 9,058 
Wald chi-squared 711 707.9 1486 1256 577.9 568.3 6442 
Model Wald p-




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes 
Wave fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes 
Notes: Method of estimation is two-stage IV. The reported coefficients correspond to the second stage 
estimation. The observations are at the individual level. All the covariates stand as in previous estimations are the 
following: gender (male, =1); age in years; marital status (married, =1); number of children; highest educational 
level attained (Primary or secondary level complete or incomplete, =1). Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: * = 10%; ** = 5%; 
*** = 1%. Log GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $) 
 
 
We find evidence that national prosperity lowers crime rates, which according to the 
literature shown above, subsequently dampers interpersonal trust. This is consistent with 
Soares (2014) who finds that a 1-percent increase in a country’s average economic growth 




al. (2002), who employ panel data to show that a 1-percent increase in GDP growth produces 
a 13.7-percentage point decline in robbery rates. Thus, economic conditions have a 
significant impact on the incidence of criminal behavior.13  
Economic growth can serve as an indicator of proper legal economic opportunities, 
rule of law, and the quality of institutions that enhance the sense of trust in society. This is 
corroborated by recent cross-country research by Lederman et al. (2002) that shows that a 1-
percent increase in the sense of trust among survey respondents was associated with a 1.2-
percent decline in homicide rates. Similarly, Buonanno et al. (2009) show that a one standard 
deviation increase in association density reduced robberies and car thefts by nearly 30 percent 
(Buonanno et al., 2009). These examples are consistent with higher levels of social capital 
being linked to lower crime rates.  
Corruption is often defined as the misuse of public power for private benefit that 
involves norms and networks in which members prioritize particularistic gains over broader 
goals and rules valid for all society (Svensson, 2005; Graf Lamsdorff, 2007). It is a social 
phenomenon that prevents cooperative behavior and deteriorates social bonds (Morris and 
Klesner, 2010). Furthermore, it is also a governance issue that reflects the health of a 
country’s legal, economic, political and cultural institutions (Svensson, 2005), defining its 
democratic performance (Hakhverdian and Mayne, 2012). Corrupt practices diminish trust 
levels in government and society, generating a vicious circle in which trust acts as both a 
                                                            
13 Conversely, crime can also have a significant impact in economic growth. For instance, between the 1980s 
and the mid-2000s, Colombia experimented a slowdown of two percentage points of its GDP’s growth rate 
due to productivity losses that resulted from a four-fold increase in criminality (Cárdenas, 2007). Similarly, 
the increase of Brazil’s crime and homicide rates during the same period had a direct cost of between three to 
five percentage points of GDP per year as these social issues represented some of the main disincentives for 




cause and effect of corruption (Morris and Klesner, 2010; Hakhverdian and Mayne, 2012).14  
Column 7 in Table 9 shows that per capita GDP has a negative and statistically 
significant impact on corruption practices. The different panels in this table report three 
alternative specifications where the instrumental variable is introduced as contemporaneous 
oil price shocks as well as in lagged form, for one and two periods, respectively. Our point 
estimates support the view that higher national income leads to a significant reduction in 
corruption.  
Heterogeneous Effects 
We now discuss how the effect of national income on trust may differ depending on 
individuals’ socioeconomic background. To this end, we include in our econometric model 
an interaction between national income and variables that capture the socioeconomic 
background of individuals. The results are presented in Table 10.  
  
                                                            
14 In Mexico, a 10-percent increase in the perception of corruption index leads to a 16-percent decline in 
interpersonal trust, and those respondents that are more tolerant of corruption are less likely to perceive 
corruptive practices (Morris and Klesner, 2010). On the other hand, corruption has been associated with the 
malfunctioning of bureaucratic institutions, generating a negative effect on economic performance and 





Table 10. Interaction Terms for the Effects of Country's Per Capita GDP (PPP) on 
Trust in People, Instrumental Variables  
  Trust in people 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Panel A. IV is contemporaneous oil price shock, t 
Log GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 
international $) 
1.286*** 1.399*** 1.570*** 
(0.381) (0.381) (0.346) 
Log GDP per capita * Living in a large size 
(=1) 
-0.0595*** -0.0616*** -0.0577*** 
  (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0105) 
Log GDP per capita*High-income individual 
(=1) 
-0.0743*** -0.0754*** -0.0817*** 
  (0.00926) (0.00930) (0.00956) 
Log GDP per capita * Inadequate education 
(=1) 
0.160*** 0.161*** 0.172*** 
  (0.0112) (0.0113) (0.0116) 
Observations 92,316 92,176 89,734 
Wald chi-squared 7737 7796 7662 
Wald chi-squared test of exogeneity 2.527 3.565 8.006 
Model Wald p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Panel B. IV: lagged values of oil price shock, t-1 
Log GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 
international $) 
1.731*** 1.853*** 2.010*** 
(0.554) (0.552) (0.461) 
Log GDP per capita*Living in a large size 
(=1) 
-0.0634*** -0.0658*** -0.0613*** 
  (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0109) 
Log GDP per capita*High-income individual 
(=1) 
-0.0743*** -0.0755*** -0.0817*** 
  (0.00951) (0.00954) (0.00971) 
Log GDP per capita * Inadequate education 
(=1) 
0.158*** 0.159*** 0.170*** 
  (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0122) 
Observations 90,320 90,180 87,744 
Wald chi-squared 7753 7817 7685 
Wald chi-squared test of exogeneity 3.603 4.480 9.416 
Model Wald p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Panel C. IV: lagged values of oil price shock, t-2 
Log GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 
international $) 
2.075*** 2.143*** 2.125*** 
(0.488) (0.487) (0.448) 
Log GDP per capita * Living in a large size 
(=1) 
-0.0691*** -0.0708*** -0.0643*** 
  (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) 
Log GDP per capita*High-income individual 
(=1) 
-0.0765*** -0.0771*** -0.0823*** 
  (0.00949) (0.00953) (0.00978) 
Log GDP per capita*Inadequate education 
(=1) 
0.153*** 0.155*** 0.168*** 




Observations 86,557 86,417 84,000 
Wald chi-squared 7769 7823 7672 
Wald chi-squared test of exogeneity 8.244 9.039 11.68 




Panel D. IV is contemporaneous and lagged values of oil price 
shock; t, t-1 
Log GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 
international $) 
0.663 0.761* 0.878* 
(0.420) (0.438) (0.522) 
Log GDP per capita*Living in a large size 
(=1) 
-0.0524*** -0.0545*** -0.0506*** 
  (0.0185) (0.0181) (0.0193) 
Log GDP per capita*High-income individual 
(=1) 
-0.0690*** -0.0702*** -0.0761*** 
  (0.0142) (0.0140) (0.0137) 
Log GDP per capita * Inadequate education 
(=1) 
0.169*** 0.171*** 0.183*** 
  (0.0249) (0.0246) (0.0207) 
Observations 90,320 90,180 87,744 
Wald chi-squared 1.620e+11 1.420e+12 1.220e+11 
Wald chi-squared test of exogeneity 0.00231 0.0113 0.155 
Model Wald p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: The method of estimation is maximum likelihood. The observations are at an individual-level unit. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Column 1 has results without any covariates; column 2 includes as 
control variables gender (male, =1), age in years, marital status (married, =1). Column 3 uses the previous 
control variables and adds: number of children, highest educational level attained (primary or secondary, 
complete / incomplete, =1) and income deciles. Fixed effects for country and survey years are included. Living 
in a large size city takes the value of =1 when the individuals lives in city with population over 100 thousand. 
High-income individuals variable has the value =1 when, based on self-assessment, consider to be members of 
income deciles from 5 to 10. Inadequate education has the value of =1 when primary or secondary levels are 
complete/incomplete. The dependent variable is measured with the question: "Generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" Where the value 
0 stands for "Need to be very careful" and 1 stands for "Most people can be trusted". Coefficients that are 
significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%. 
 
We see that the effect of an increase in national income on trust is significantly larger 
among small-town (as opposed to large city) dwellers; among low income (as opposed to 
high income) and less educated (as opposed to highly educated) individuals. Taken together, 
this suggests that income growth enhances trust especially among individuals in the lower 
socioeconomic category. This reinforces Banfield’s (1958) speculation that economic 





It is noteworthy that, while significantly smaller, the effect of national income on trust 
is still positive and significantly different from zero among parts of the population that are 
well off. For example, in column 1 the value of the interaction term for large-city dwellers is 
-0.059; the coefficient on GDP per capita is 1.286. Hence, for an average individual that lives 
in a large city, the implied effect of a 1-percent increase in GDP per capita on the likelihood 
of trust is 1.23 percent. If an individual lives in a large city, has high income, and adequate 
education, the effect is around 1.15 percent. 
Concluding Remarks 
As generalized trust has been recognized an important factor for economic 
development, its determinants deserve studying. Already Banfield (1958) in his seminal 
study of distrust in southern Italy advanced the hypothesis that poverty and backwardness 
can be one of the determinants of distrust among people. Yet, causal evidence on this channel 
has been sparse. In this paper, we use all available waves of the World Values Surveys to 
address the issue. Employing an instrumental variable approach to overcome endogeneity 
biases and focusing on within country variations, we find that national income has a positive 
average effect on the level of trust. In particular, an increase of 1 percent in the former 
variable leads to a one-percentage-point increase in the likelihood of trust. This result is 
generally consistent with the cross-country study of Bjornskov (2006) and with the study of 
Russia by Ananyev and Guriev (2018). The detected effect appears uniform across countries 
at different levels of economic development, but stronger among poor, less educated, small-
town residents.  
We hypothesized that economic prosperity affects trust by enhancing civic behaviors. 




behavior and corruption. Reassuringly and consistent with our hypothesis, we found that an 
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Appendix A. List of Countries 
1 ALB Albania 32 JOR Jordan 
2 DZA Algeria 33 LVA Latvia 
3 ARM Armenia 34 LTU Lithuania 
4 AUS Australia 35 MYS Malaysia 
5 AZE Azerbaijan 36 MLI Mali 
6 BGD Bangladesh 37 MEX Mexico 
7 BLR Belarus 38 MAR Morocco 
8 BRA Brazil 39 NLD Netherlands 
9 BGR Bulgaria 40 NZL New Zealand 
10 BFA Burkina Faso 41 NGA Nigeria 
11 CAN Canada 42 NOR Norway 
12 CHL Chile 43 PAK Pakistan 
13 COL Colombia 44 PER Peru 
14 HRV Croatia 45 PHL Philippines 
15 CYP Cyprus 46 POL Poland 
16 SLV El Salvador 47 QAT Qatar 
17 EST Estonia 48 ROU Romania 
18 ETH Ethiopia 49 RWA Rwanda 
19 FIN Finland 50 SGP Singapore 
20 FRA France 51 SVN Slovenia 
21 GEO Georgia 52 ZAF South Africa 
22 DEU Germany 53 ESP Spain 
23 GHA Ghana 54 TZA Tanzania 
24 GTM Guatemala 55 THA Thailand 
25 HUN Hungary 56 TUR Turkey 
26 IND India 57 UGA Uganda 
27 IDN Indonesia 58 UKR Ukraine 
28 IRQ Iraq 59 USA United States 
29 ISR Israel 60 URY Uruguay 
30 ITA Italy 61 ZMB Zambia 
31 JPN Japan 62 ZWE Zimbabwe 









Appendix B. Description of Variables 
Variable name Description 
Log GDP per capita, PPP 
(constant 2011 international $) 
Annual real per capita GDP measured in constant international 
dollars from 2011. Current dollars were converted using 
purchasing power parity (PPP) rates based on the 2011 
International Comparison Round (ICP). Then, the log values 
were taken. 
Agreement with opinion that says 
that most people can be trusted 
The information is taken by the question: "Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to 
be very careful in dealing with people?" The original answers 
were coded 1 which stands for "Most people can be trusted" and 
2 which equals "Need to be very careful". These values were 
recoded into a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 and 
0, respectively.  
Oilshock, t 
Natural logarithm of the simple average of oil prices from the 
Dubai, Brent and Texas report (UNCTAD), multiplied by the 
share of net oil exports in GDP. 
Male 
Dichotomous variable; has the value of 1 to indicate “Men” and 0 
otherwise. Source: WVS. 
Age 
Continuous variable that reports individual ages in years. Source: 
WVS. 
Marital status: married 
Dichotomous variable; has a value of 1 to indicate “Married” and 
0 otherwise. Source: WVS. 
Number of children Continuous variable. Source: WVS. 
Highest educational level attained 
Dichotomous variable; has the value of 1 to indicate “Primary or 
Secondary complete/incomplete” and 0 otherwise. Source: WVS. 
Survey year 
Year in which the individual reported. Transformed into 
dichotomous variable to indicate each year value and control for 
fixed effects. Source: WVS. 
Country of residence 
Country in which the individual lives when he or she answered 
the WVS. Transformed into dichotomous variable to indicate 
each country control for fixed effects. Source: WVS. 
Living in a large city 
Dichotomous variable; has the value of 1 to indicate that the 
individual lives in a city with population over 100 thousand; and 
0 otherwise. Source: WVS. 
High-income individual 
Dichotomous variable; has the value of 1 to indicate that the 
individual reports, based on self-perception, that he belongs to the 
income deciles from 5 to 10 The variables takes the value of 0 
otherwise. Source: WVS. 
Victim of car thefts in the last five 
years 
The information is taken by the question: “Over the past five 
years have you or other members of your household had any of 
their cars/vans/trucks stolen? Please take your time to think 
about it”. The answer is coded into a dichotomous variable; has 
the value of 1 to indicate “Yes” and 0 if the answer is “No”. 
Source: ICVS  
Victim of car thefts in the last 
year 
The information is taken by the question: “Over the past year 
have you or other members of your household had any of their 
cars/vans/trucks stolen? Please take your time to think about it”. 
The answer is coded into a dichotomous variable; has the value of 




Victim of robbery in the last five 
years 
The information is taken by the question: “Over the past five 
years has anyone taken something from you, by using force, or 
threatening you? Or did anyone try do to so?” The answer is 
coded into a dichotomous variable; has the value of 1 to indicate 
“Yes” and 0 if the answer is “No”. Source: ICVS 
Victim of robbery in the last year 
The information is taken by the question: “Over the last year has 
anyone taken something from you, by using force, or threatening 
you? Or did anyone try do to so?” The answer is coded into a 
dichotomous variable; has the value of 1 to indicate “Yes” and 0 
if the answer is “No”. Source: ICVS  
Victim of assault in the last year 
The information is taken by the question: “Apart from the 
incidents just covered (i.e. theft of cars, burglary, attempted 
burglary, personal theft, sexual offences), have you over the past 
five years been personally attacked or threatened by someone in 
a way that really frightened you either at home or elsewhere, 
such as in a pub, in the street, at school, on public transport, on 
the beach, or at your workplace?” The answer is coded into a 
dichotomous variable; has the value of 1 to indicate “Yes” and 0 
if the answer is “No”. Source: ICVS 
Victim of assault in the last five 
years 
The information is taken by the question: “Apart from the 
incidents just covered (i.e. theft of cars, burglary, attempted 
burglary, personal theft, sexual offences), have you over the past 
five years been personally attacked or threatened by someone in 
a way that really frightened you either at home or elsewhere, 
such as in a pub, in the street, at school, on public transport, on 
the beach, or at your workplace?” The answer is coded into a 
dichotomous variable; has the value of 1 to indicate “Yes” and 0 
if the answer is “No”. Source: ICVS 
Victim of corruption in the last 5 
years 
The information is taken by the question: “In some areas there is 
a problem of corruption among government or public officials. 
During 1999, has any government official, for instance a customs 
officer, police officer or inspector in your own country, asked you 
or expected you to pay a bribe for his service?” The answer is 
coded into a dichotomous variable; has the value of 1 to indicate 




Appendix C. Trust and GDP: Interaction Terms with OECD Country Members 
 
  Trust in people 
  (1) (2) (3) 
OECD country member (=1) 
0.873 0.954 -1.784 
(0.715) (0.716) (1.114) 
Log GDP per capita, PPP (constant 
2011 international $) 
0.106* 0.109* 0.215*** 
(0.0575) (0.0575) (0.0722) 
OECD country member (=1)*Log 
GDP per capita 
-0.130* -0.138** 0.117 
(0.0666) (0.0666) (0.100) 
Constant -0.326 -0.296 -1.416** 
  (0.496) (0.496) (0.632) 
Fixed effects       
Country Yes Yes Yes 
Survey year Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 164,457 164,044 138,037 
LR chi2 12579 12579 12579 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood -70974 -70974 -70974 
Note: The method of estimation is probit. The observations are at an individual-level 
unit. Standard errors in parentheses. Covariates follow the same specification as in 
previous tables. In column (1) there are no additional control variables. In column (2) 
control variables are: male, age in years and marital status. Column (3) has the same 
covariates as column (2) and adds the number of children and the highest educational 
level attained. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the 





Appendix D. Weak Instrument Robust Tests and Confidence Sets for IV Probit 
 
Test Panel A. Instrumental variable Oilshock, t 
 (1) (2) (3) 
AR 17.28*** 18.41*** 25.54*** 
 [ .512, 1.430] [ .551, 1.463] [ .904, 2.033] 
Wald 17.25*** 18.38*** 25.48*** 
 [ .515, 1.434] [ .547, 1.467] [ .898, 2.038] 
 Panel B. Instrumental variable Oilshock, t-1 
 (1) (2) (3) 
AR 8.57*** 9.79*** 17.16*** 
 [ .418, 2.066] [ .504, 2.154] [ .983, 2.722] 
Wald 8.55*** 9.77*** 17.09*** 
 [ .410, 2.075] [ .496, 2.162] [ .974, 2.73] 
 Panel C. Instrumental variable Oilshock, t-2 
 (1) (2) (3) 
AR 7.47*** 7.85*** 8.97*** 
 [ .401, 2.372] [ .437, 2.412] [ .814, 3.830] 
Wald 7.45*** 7.83*** 8.92*** 
 [ .391, 2.382] [ .426, 2.422] [ .798, 3.845] 
 Panel D. Instrumental variable Oilshock, t and t-1 
 (1) (2) (3) 
CLR 16.19*** 16.80*** 23.47*** 
 [ .453, 1.298] [ .469, 1.314] [ .816, 1.908] 
K 16.19*** 16.80*** 23.47*** 
 [ .453, 1.298] [ .469, 1.314] [ .816, 1.908] 
AR 17.41*** 18.48*** 25.72*** 
 [ .401, 1.320] [ .452, 1.331] [ .838, 1.886] 
Wald 16.17*** 16.78*** 23.42*** 
 [ .449, 1.302] [ .465, 1.3182] [ .811, 1.914] 
 Panel E. Instrumental variable Oilshock, t, t-1 and t-2 
 (1) (2) (3) 
CLR 13.59*** 13.96*** 22.37*** 
 [ .345, 1.114] [ .355, 1.124] [ .817, 1.955] 
K 13.58*** 13.95*** 22.36*** 
 [ .345, 1.114] [ .355, 1.124] [ .817, 1.955] 
AR 16.89*** 17.89*** 25.05*** 
 [ .3140, 1.145] [ .355, 1.124] [ .724, 2.048] 
Wald 13.57*** 13.94*** 22.32*** 
 [ .3415, 1.118] [ .351, 1.128] [ .811, 1.961] 
Notes: Tests are computed within a non-linear two-step estimation 
framework allowing for an endogenous repressor. Statistics confidence 
level follows the system: 10% = *; 5%=**; 1%=***. Confidence sets are 
presented in brackets. These are computed with confidence levels of 95%, 
for 100 points across a range with the method of minimum distance (MD). 




Appendix E. Crime Victims and National Gross Domestic Product, first stage estimation 
Mechanisms of transmission 
 
 
Dependent variable Log GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Panel A. IV is contemporaneous oil price shock, t 
Contemporaneous oil price 
shock, t 
-115.249 -115.249 -115.249 -115.249 -115.249 -115.249 
(3.207)*** (3.207)*** (3.207)*** (3.207)*** (3.207)*** (3.207)*** 
Constant 9.637 9.637 9.637 9.637 9.637 9.637 
  (0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.031)*** 
Observations 10,910 10,910 10,910 10,910 10,910 10,910 
R-squared 0.483 0.483 0.483 0.483 0.483 0.483 
F-statistic 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 
              
  Panel B. IV is contemporaneous oil price shock, t-1 
Lagged values of oil price shock, 
t-1 
  
-11.167 -11.167 -11.167 -11.167 -11.167 -11.167 
(2.980)*** (2.980)*** (2.980)*** (2.980)*** (2.980)*** (2.980)*** 
Constant 9.776 9.776 9.776 9.776 9.776 9.776 
  (0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.031)*** 
Observations 10,910 10,910 10,910 10,910 10,910 10,910 
R-squared 0.447 0.447 0.447 0.447 0.447 0.447 
F-statistic  1441   1441   1441   1441   1441   1441  
              
  Panel C. IV is contemporaneous oil price shock, t-2 
Lagged values of oil price shock, 
t-2 
  
74.963 74.963 74.963 74.963 74.963 74.963 
(2.941)*** (2.941)*** (2.941)*** (2.941)*** (2.941)*** (2.941)*** 
Constant 10.455 10.455 10.455 10.455 10.455 10.455 
  (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** 
Observations 9,058 9,058 9,058 9,058 9,058 9,058 
R-squared 0.463 0.463 0.463 0.463 0.463 0.463 
F-statistic 1167 1167 1167 1167 1167 1167 
Individual covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wave fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The method of estimation is two stage least squares. The coefficients correspond to the first stage estimation. The observations are at the individual-level unit. 
All the covariates stand as in preceding estimations. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is measured with the question: "Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" where the value 0 stands for "Need to be very 
careful" and 1 stands for "Most people can be trusted". Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: * = 10%; ** = 5%; 
*** = 1%. 
